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Abstract
In recent years, significant efforts for improving the technical and the economic performance of smart grids have been applied
with the presence of different players making decisions in these grids. This paper proposes a bilevel hierarchical structure for
designing and planning distributed energy resources in home microgrids (H-MGs). Such a small-scale grid inside the market
environment permits energy exchange among distributed energy resources and home microgrids through a pool market. In
this paper, each home microgrid’s planner maximizes the performance of distributed energy resources while exchanging energy
with other H-MGs. The problem is formulated as a high-level problem decomposed into a set of low-level market clearing
problems. The global optimal performance in terms of energy cost is met for a market structure (H-MGs, consumers, and
retailers) at a Nash optimum point for the formulated scheduling game considering local and general constraints on the spot
market. In general, the upper-level structure is based on H-MG generation competition for maximizing their individual and/or
group income in the process of forming coalition with other H-MGs. In addition, the functionality of the lower-level of the
hierarchical structure is governed by a market clearing based on the price response method by all the DERs enabling H-MGs
to change the spot market strategic behavior. Prices are obtained as dual variables of power balance equations. This paper
will investigate a set of bilevel games, including nonlinear programming problems solved through a complementary problem
method. Using the binary theory, the bilevel hierarchical structure will be replanned using a nonlinear problem. Results prove
that the proposed structure can increase the players’s profit.
Keywords: Smart grids, electricity generation market, coalition formation, responsive load, bidding strategy, bilevel
programming.
Nomenclature
Acronyms
CHP combined heat and power
EB electrical boiler
EHP electrical heat pump
ES+/ES- energy storage (ES) during charg-
ing/discharging mode
GB gas boiler
k+/k- buying/ selling power from/to H-MG i/ Re-
tailer k
MCP market clearing price
DR+, DR- amount of responsive load demand (RLD)
that goes from/comes to other time period
to/from t
STP solar thermal panel
TES thermal energy storage
Email address: Jabervalinejad@vt.edu Corresponding
author (Jaber Valinejad)
WT wind turbine
RET retailer
A, B, C home microgrids
Indices
w the number of scenario (w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,W})
i/m the number of H-MG (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I})
j the number of DERs existing in H-MG i (j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , J})
t time (t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T })
D the amount of electrical load consumer
DERs’s demand (i.e., EB, EHP, ES) and/or
consumers existing in H-MG i
k the number of a retailer (k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n})
e/h electrical/thermal
FU fuel consumed by thermal DERs (i.e., CHP,
EB)
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Constants
ζCHP,hij the thermal efficiency of CHP
ζCHP,eij /ζ
′CHP,e
ij the electrical efficiency of CHP
piFU the offer price of natural gas
SOCES,iniij
SOCES,endij
SOC initial and final value related to ES j in
H-MG i [kW]
SOCTES,iniij
SOCTES,endij
SOC initial and final value related to TES j in
H-MG i [kW]
ζEBij , ζ
TES
ij the thermal efficiency of EB/TES
COPEHP coefficient of performance of EHP
MCij marginal cost of DER j in H-MG i [£/kWh]
Pij, Pij maximum electrical/thermal power gener-
ated by DER j in H-MG i [kW]
Parameters
λ˜tw
MCP
the value of predicted electrical clearing
price at time t under scenario w [£/kWh]
P˜D,eitw predicted load power consumed by the con-
sumers in H-MG i at time t under scenariow
[kW]
Functions
Rij the revenue of DER j related to H-MG i [£]
Ri the revenue of H-MG i in independent oper-
ation [£]
Rim the revenue resulting from coalitional oper-
ation between H-MG i and H-MG m [£]
Decision Variables
piX,eijtw/pi
Y,h
ijtw electrical/ thermal selling price bid by DER j
under scenario w at time t [£/kWh]
Peijtw/P
h
ijtw electrical/thermal power generated by DER
j at time t under scenario w [kW]
Peiktw electrical power sold to/bought from H-MG
i/ Retailer k at time t under scenariow [kW]
PD,eitw active power consumed by the consumers at
H-MG i at time t under scenario w [kW]
P′D,eitt’w shifted load power from time interval t to
time interval t ′ at H-MG i under scenario w
[kW]
PEB,eijtw ,
PEHP,eijtw
consumed load power by EB/EHP j at H-MG
i at time t under scenario w [kW]
λMCP,et ,
λMCP,ht
electrical and thermal market clearing price
at time t [£/kWh]
Pe−imtw, P
e+
imtw buying/selling electrical power from H-MG i
to H-MG m [kW]
P
e−/+
iktw /P
e−/+
kitw buying/ selling electrical power from/to H-
MG i/ Retailer k [kW]
Ph−imtw/P
h+
imtw buying/selling thermal power from/to H-
MG i/H-MG m [kW]
pie−iktw/pi
e+
iktw supply bids for buying/ selling electrical
power from/to H-MG i/Retailer k [kW]
pih−imtw/pi
h+
imtw supply bids for buying/selling thermal power
from/to H-MG i/H-MG m [kW]
1. Introduction
Demand-side management (DSM) topics are focused on
energy consumption control at the consumer side [1, 2].
Such energy control is coordinated by electric utilities, com-
panies and enterprises without controlling distributed energy
resources [3, 4]. When the latter is controlled, the topic
would be defined as an energy management [5].
demandThis objective of this paper is to first propose a base
framework for the demand of consumers encompassing H-
MGs, and second investigate profits that can be made from
operating H-MGs independently or in a coalitional structure
in a daily electricity market [6, 7]. For these purposes, en-
ergy exchange among H-MGs is formulated as a scheduling
game. In this paper, competitive monopolies are modeled
and simulated in a formulated convex optimization prob-
lem [8, 9]. These monopolies are based on three contra-
dictory objectives: H-MGs’s and retailers’s income maximiza-
tion, consumers’s cost reduction, and demand peak reduction
[10].
With the aim of a convex optimization problem, a bilevel
hierarchical interactive architecture (BL-HIA) algorithm on
the condition of reaching a maximum profit is proposed for
both consumer and the power generator side [11, 12]. The
optimum performance problem is presented for all DERs ex-
isting in multiple H-MGs as a BL-HIA so that it is a mixed inte-
ger programming problem [13, 14]. The upper-level targets
maximizing H-MGs’s profit through energy exchange among
H-MGs as well as H-MGs and retailers for a central optimal
performance of a decision maker [14, 15]. On the other
hand, the lower-level of the hierarchal structure of the prob-
lem represents an equilibrium problem incorporating DSM
for an optimal performance of multiple H-MGs [1, 5]. This
way, a central optimum performance decision maker for en-
ergy optimum exchange among H-MGs with each other and
with retailers in an independent and a coalitional perfor-
mance and with the aim of reaching H-MGs’s maximum profit
is included at an upper-level decision maker while consider-
ing an independent or a coalitional performance of all H-MGs
[16–18]. The interaction between the two levels of the hier-
archal structure of the game is a factor of searching for the op-
timal solution at both levels [4, 5]. Considering the optimal
scheduling of all H-MGs and DERs existing in them in Multi-
ple H-MGs requires solving mathematical program with equi-
librium constraints (MPEC) equivalent to bilevel problem.
This bilevel problem can be looked at as a multiple-leader-
common-follower game. The aim of implementing this game
structure is finding a final equilibrium point in which none
of H-MGs and consumers can increase their profit by chang-
ing in the generation and the consumption schedules. Fur-
thermore, the BL-HIA structure accounts for decisions result-
ing from forming a coalition among H-MGs to maximize the
profit and also exchange energy among them.
The contribution in this work can be summarized as fol-
lows: First, the proposed BL-HIA structure is preferable over
the proposed structure in [19] as it is a multi-ownership
structure that permits, forming coalition among H-MGs and
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Figure 1: The proposed BL-HIA structure illustrating a variety of coali-
tion formation among H-MGs. UL:A...LL:BC implies that the HMG A is
modeled in the upper level while HMGs B and C are modeled in lower
level.Distributed energy resources encompass set of distributed generation,
electrical and thermal energy storage.
explicitly increasing the competition among H-MGs and con-
sumers rather than an independent operation of H-MGs. Sec-
ond, the BL-HIA is adequate for modelling problems with
several leaders (i.e., H-MGs) having their own individual ob-
jective functions when operating independently or in a coali-
tional manner (upper-level problem). Such a game is to opti-
mize several followers (i.e., consumers inserted in the bilevel
structure). These models are related to situations where ac-
tions and followers’s performance in BL-HIA have a signifi-
cant effect on decisions made by leaders. This fact is related
to the case in which H-MGs’s profit (a leader) depends on
the amount of energy which is sold for supplying consumers
existing in the power grid (as follower). The general view
of the hierarchical structure and optimization problems has
been shown with the proposed model in Figure. 2. Third, a
better strategy maximizing consumers’s satisfaction in terms
of demand supply and H-MGs’s profit is presented in compar-
ison to a single level structure. Finally, the BL-HIA structure is
solved by formulating an equivalent one level mixed-integer
nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem deploying the KKT
optimization conditions. The innovations in this paper can be
summarized as follows:
1. An optimum programming solution within H-MGs gen-
eration as a BL-HIA structure;
2. Providing a multiple-leader-common-follower game
which states the effectiveness of the market competition
in multiple H-MGs through solving a BL-HIA structure;
3. Developing a new model for demand-side management;
4. Accommodating both DR resources and storage devices
in the market operation to achieve a comprehensive so-
lution exploiting all flexibilities; and
5. Proposing an advanced electricity market for active dis-
tribution networks based on game theory;
2. The Proposed BL-HIA Structure
The problem encountered by the H-MGs for an indepen-
dent or a coalitional operation can be modelled as a bilevel
structure that is a decision-making problem including sev-
eral agents which try to optimize their corresponding objec-
tive functions on a connectable dependent set. An agent is,
in fact, an object which can act as a DER or connected to
other units. The BL-HIA structure is shown in Figure. 2. The
upper-level problem states maximizing the profit of H-MGs
having a higher priority of operating in an independent or a
coalitional operation on the condition of: 1) satisfying upper-
level constraints and 2) satisfying a set of lower-level prob-
lems. H-MGs with a higher priority of operation in the upper-
level problem are identified based on their price bids. Upper-
level constraints include limits on the quantity and supply
bids of DERs resources, the minimum accessible power ca-
pacity by the market regulator, and buying/selling quantities
by H-MGs and retailers. Lower-level problem states the mar-
ket clearing prices (MCP) with the aim of maximizing the
profit of H-MGs having lower priority of operation subject
to meeting equilibrium constraints for each H-MG, genera-
tion/consumption limits, and the number of consumers par-
ticipating in the DSM program.
As it is observed in Figure. 2, the higher priority of H-
MGs operation (in an independent or a coalitional opera-
tion) is defined by the energy excess/shortage gap and sup-
ply/demand bids that permits a maximization of an expected
profit. Maximizing the profit of each H-MG is achieved by
considering the fact that each agent at the lower-level prob-
lem shows an optimal operation in correspondence to the in-
come of H-MGs with higher priority of operation based on
the offered price. This optimal operation includes an estima-
tion of the demand supplied and shifted by each consumer
in an independent or a coalitional operation. It must be em-
phasized that the competition among H-MGs with higher and
lower priority (or competitor H-MGs) are explicitly modelled
at upper and lower-levels. It must be noted that upper-level
and lower-level problems shown in Figure. 2 become related
to each other. In other words, lower-level problems estimate
the price and the quantity of competitor H-MGs which di-
rectly affect the profit of H-MGs inserted in the above prob-
lem. In other words, decisions related to forming a coalition
and taking a bidding strategy by the competitor strategic H-
MGs in the upper-level problem have also a significant effect
on the MCP resulted from the lower-level problem.
The BL-HIA structure is shown in Figure. 1. In BL-HIA
structure is also considered for modelling the uncertainty of
pool prices, electrical/thermal load demand, and H-MGs buy-
ing/selling prices. The proposed bilevel model has been sim-
plified as a one-level problem using KKT method [20] for the
sake of convexification.
3. Decision-Making Process by BL-HIA Structure
The decision-making process in the BL-HIA structure of H-
MGs, consumers and retailers can be summarized as shown
in Figure. 3. At the beginning of the scheduling horizon, each
H-MG presents the necessary decisions on DSM for an inde-
pendent or a coalitional operation with other H-MGs. More-
over, supply/demand bids are provided to the consumers dur-
3
U
pp
er
-le
ve
l
Solar irradiance 
prediction
Power 
generated by PV
Modelling uncertainty using Taghochi method
Load  forcasting
Wind speed 
prediction
Power 
generated by 
WT
Electricity price 
prediction
Retailers
(maximizing profit)
H-MGs with higher priority in independent or 
coalitional operation (maximizing profit )
DERs ( maximizing profit )
Equilibrium between upper and 
lower level
Generation and 
consumption resources 
optimum offer
Lo
w
er
-le
ve
l
H-MGs with lower priority in independent or 
coalitional operation  (maximizing profit)
Retailers   
(maximizing profit)
Figure 2: BL-HIA structure.
Prior to the planning 
horizon
Planning horizon
Selection of the upstream grid 
or H-MGs for coalition 
formation and the selling 
prices offered to the 
consumers (H-MGs and 
retailers) Selection of the DER for the 
planning horizon (H-MGs and 
consumers)
Pool trading decisions in each 
period of the planning horizon 
(H-MGs, consumers and 
retailers) 
Figure 3: Decision-making process.
ing this horizon. These decisions are made under uncertain-
ties of a future pool market prices, consumers’s load profile,
and competitor H-MGs’s supply bids. The supply bids are a
function of the cost of DER installed in the H-MG.
1. Consumers’s choice of energy provider:
When each H-MG offers a suuply bid, consumers are to
choose a H-MG as an energy provider to their electri-
cal/thermal load during the scheduling horizon. These
decisions are made based on reliable information on
such prices estimated under uncertainties of pool prices
and demand. For modelling purposes, several sets of
consumers are created by grouping consumers with sim-
ilar specifications responding to H-MG’s offered prices).
2. Energy exchange in a pool market by the H-MGs:
After stabilizing the H-MGs’s performance (an indepen-
dent or a coalitional operation) and setting supply and
demand bids, each H-MG can decide in each time inter-
val of the scheduling horizon on the quantity (to/from
other H-MGs in the pool market) to supply the demand
of their consumers.
4. Problem Formulation
The H-MGs’s scheduling problem is formulated in a BL-
HIA structure. It must be noted that dual variables have
been separated by comma after equality and inequality con-
straints. This section will briefly present models deployed for
load shifting, and those representing the interaction among
DER, H-MGs, consumers and retailers as well as the coalition
among H-MGs. Then, BL-HIA problem formulation will be
presented.
4.1. DR Objective Function and Constraints
max RDSMi = 0.5×
T∑
t′=1
PD,eit’w ×
(
λ˜MCPtw − λ˜
MCP
t’w
)
(1)
The profit resulting from the participation of consumers in
DSM program is calculated from (1):
PD,eitw = P˜
D,e
itw +
∑
t′
P′D,eitt’w : γ
D,e
itw (2)∑
t→t′
P′D,eitt’w 6 P˜
D,e
itw : η
D,e
itw ∀(λ˜MCPtw > λ˜MCPt’w ),∀P′D,ett’w > 0 (3)
P′D,eitt’w > 0 : η
D,e
itt’w
(4)
P′D,eitt’w = 0 : η
D,e
itt’w ,∀t = t ′ (5)
Equation (3) states that if the value of the demand shifted
from time interval t to t ′ is given when λ˜MCPtw > λ˜
MCP
t’w , then
this value is not to exceed the predicted load value at t (i.e.,
P˜D,eitw ). Equations (4) and (5) are set to ensure that load shift-
ing is not defined for the same interval. The load shifted from
t to t ′ is equivalent to the negative value of the demand de-
ducted from the predicted demand at t as described by
P′D,eitt’w = −P
′D,e
itt’w : η
′D,e
itt’w . (6)
4.2. CHP Objective Function and Constraints
max RCHPij =
T∑
t=1
PCHP,eijtw ×piCHP,eijtw +PCHP,hijtw ×piCHP,hijtw −
PCHP,hijtw
NCHP,hi
×piFU
(7)
The objective is to maximize the profit that can be made
through CHP systems’s participation in DSM program as
in (7):
PCHP,eij 6 P
CHP,e
ijtw 6 P
CHP,e
ij : η
CHP,e
ijtw
,ηCHP,eijtw , (8)
PCHP,hij 6 P
CHP,h
ijtw 6 P
CHP,h
ij : η
CHP,h
ijtw
,ηCHP,hijtw , (9)
PCHP,eijtw = ζ
CHP,e
ij ×
PCHP,hijtw
ζCHP,hij
+ ζ′CHP,eij : γ
CHP,e
ijtw (10)
Equations (8) and (9) state upper and lower limits on the
power generated by the CHPs. Equation (10) describes the
power generated by the CHPs as a function of the system’s
efficiency
4.3. WT Objective Function and Constraints
max RWTij =
T∑
t=1
PWTijtw × piWTijtw (11)
The profit resulting from the participation of WT in the
DSM program is calculated by (11):
0 6 PWTijtw 6 P
WT
ij : ζ
WT,e
tw , ζ
WT,e
tw (12)
Equation (12) (and similar constraints for determining
the limit on DER resources) state programmed power gen-
eration of DER controllable and non-controllable resources.
Equation (12) is related to the wind turbine electrical power
whose maximum limit is a parameter having uncertainty.
4
4.4. ES and TES Objective Functions and Constraints
max RES/TESij =
T∑
t=1
PES/TESijtw × piES/TESijtw (13)
The profit made by the participation of an electri-
cal/thermal energy storage (ES/TES) system in a DSM pro-
gram is measured by the objective function in (13):
− PES/TESij 6 P
ES/TES
ijtw 6 P
ES/TES
ij : η
ES/TES
tw
,ηES/TEStw (14)
SOCES/TESijtw = SOC
ES/TES
ij(t-1)w +
PES/TESijtw
P
ES/TES
ij
: γES/TESijtw (15)
SOCES/TESij 6 SOC
ES/TES
ijtw 6 SOC
ES/TES
ij : η
ES/TES,SOC
ijtw
,ηES/TES,SOCijtw
(16)
SOCES/TESij(t-1)w = SOC
ES/TES,ini
ij : γ
′ES/TES
ijtw (17)
SOCES/TESij(t=24)w = SOC
ES/TES,end
ij : γ
′′ES/TES
ijw (18)
Equations (14)–(18) are the equations governing the op-
eration of ES/TES systems. The operation of ES/TES system
is subject to generation limits as in (14) and state of charge
limits as in (15)–(18). It should be noted that (16) states the
charge/discharge rate of the ES/TES system.
4.5. EB Constraints
max REBij =
T∑
t=1
(
PEB,hijtw × piEB,hijtw − PEB,eijtw × piEB,eijtw
)
(19)
The profit made by the participation of EB in the DSM pro-
gram is calculated by (19):
PEB,hijtw = ζ
EB
ij × PEB,eijtw : ζEB,htw (20)
0 6 PEB,hijtw 6 P
EB,h
ij : η
EB,h
ijtw
,ηEB,hijtw (21)
Eqs. (20) and (21) state the consumed amount of electrical
power and the generated heat in the electrical boiler, respec-
tively.
4.6. EHP Objective Function and Constraints
max REHPij =
T∑
t=1
(
PEHP,hijtw × piEHP,hijtw − PEHP,eijtw × piEHP,eijtw
)
(22)
The profit made by the participation of EHP in the DSM
program is calculated by (22):
PEHP,hijtw = COP
EHP × PEHP,eijtw : γHP,hijtw (23)
0 6 PEHP,hijtw 6 P
EHP,h
ijtw : η
EHP,h
ijtw
,ηEHP,hijtw (24)
Equation (23) describes the relation between the con-
sumed amount of electrical and thermal power generated by
the thermal pump. In addition, (24) represents limits on the
thermal generation.
4.7. GB Objective Function and Constraints
max RGBij =
T∑
t=1
(
PGBijtw × piGBijtw −
PGBijtw
NGBij
× piFU
)
(25)
The profit made by the participation of GB in the DSM pro-
gram is calculated by (25).
0 6 PGBijtw 6 P
GB
ij : η
GB,h
ijtw
,ηGB,hijtw (26)
Equation (26) states the allowable limits on the heat gen-
eration by the gas boiler.
4.8. STP Objective Function and Constraints
max RSTPij =
T∑
t=1
(
PSTPijtw × piSTPijtw
)
(27)
The profit made by the participation of STP in a DSM pro-
gram is calculated by Eq. (27):
0 6 PSTPijtw 6 P
STP
ij : η
STP,h
ijtw
,ηSTP,hijtw , (28)
Equation (28) states the heat generation allowable limits
for the operation of a thermal solar panel. In common with a
wind turbine, the solar panel thermal maximum limit is also
considered to be an uncertainty factor.
4.9. DERs’s Price Bid Constraints
0 6 piX,eijtw 6 λ˜MCP,etw (29)
0 6 piY,hijtw 6 2× λ˜MCP,etw (30)
Equations (29) and (30) are related to the electrical and
thermal price bids governing DERs’s operation where X in-
cludes CHP, ES, WT; and Y encompasses CHP, EB, EHP, TES,
GB, STP. However, the value of the upper and lower bounds
can vary with respect to the system deployed.
5. H-MGs’s Independent and Coalitional Operation
Two scenarios are implemented to simulate the perfor-
mance of the proposed BL-HIA structure. These scenarios
are described as follows:
• Scenario 1:
This scenario describes independent operations of H-
MGs ({A},{B},{C},{RET}). A single-level algorithm is
deployed to model this scenario as further clarified by
the independent operation of H-MGs.
• Scenario 2: ({A,{B,C}}, {{A,B},C}, {{A,C},B},
{B,{A,C}}, {{B,C},A}, {C,{A,B}}):
This scenario describes a coalition among H-MGs taking
place at a single level of the BL-HIA structure and op-
erating in an independent operation at the other level.
A representation of such a scenario can take the shape
of ({A,BC}, {AB,C}, {AC,B}, {B,AC}, {BC,A}, {C,{AB}}).
This scenario also investigates the effect of the lower-
level H-MGs forming a coalition on changing the strat-
egy of operating the upper-level H-MG with a high prior-
ity independently. The mathematical model of this sce-
nario is further clarified by the coalitional operation of
H-MGs as shown next.
5
5.1. Scenario 1
Equation (31) states the profit gained by selling energy by
Retailer k to all H-MGs.
max RRETk =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
(Pe-kitw × pie-kitw − Pe-iktw × pie-iktw) (31)
Equation (32) state the profit obtained through the inde-
pendent operation of the H-MGs ({A}, {B},{C}). It is worth
mentioning that if a DER does not exist in an H-MG, it is not
considered in the respective objective function.
RA/B/C =
T∑
t=1
W∑
w=1
J∑
j=1

PESijtw × piESijtw + PWTijtw × piWTijtw
PSTPijtw × piSTPijtw + PEHP,hijtw × piEHP,hijtw
PTESijtw × piTESijtw + PEB,hijtw × piEB,hijtw
−PEB,eijtw × piEB,eijtw + PGBijtw × piGBijtw
+PCHP,eijtw × piCHP,eijtw + PCHP,hijtw × piCHP,hijtw
+Pe-imtw × pie-imtw + Pe-iktw × pie-iktw
+Ph-imtw × pih-imtw − Pe+imtw × pie+imtw
+Pe+iktw × pie+iktw − Ph+imtw × pih+imtw

+RDSMi (i = A/B/C)
(32)
5.2. Scenario 2
Equations (33)–(34) state the profit obtained through the
coalitional operation of H-MGs ({A},{B},{C}) at an upper-
level or a lower-level.
max R{AB}i = R
{A}
i @R
{B}
i (33)
max R{ABC}i = R
{A}
i @R
{B}
i @R
{C}
i (34)
where @ states the coalition among different H-MGs. In ad-
dition, coalitional scenario of ({B,AC}) means that the first
part (B) is related to the objective function defined at the
upper-level and a second part (AC) is related to coalition be-
tween H-MGs A and C but defined at a lower level.
Equations (35)–(40) state the profit obtained from the
coalitional operation of H-MGs A, B, and C at an upper or
a lower level.
The right-hand side of these relations is made up of two
parts. The first part is related to the objective function de-
fined at the upper level; whereas, the second part is related
to the objective function defined at the lower level.
max R{A,BC}i = R
{A}
i @R
{BC}
i (35)
max R{AB,C}i = R
{AB}
i @R
{C}
i (36)
max R{AC,B}i = R
{AC}
i @R
{B}
i (37)
max R{B,AC}i = R
{B}
i @R
{AC}
i (38)
max R{BC,A}i = R
{BC}
i @R
{A}
i (39)
max R{C,AB}i = R
{C}
i @R
{AB}
i (40)
6. Mathematical Formulation of BL-HIA Structure
In the upper-level problem, each H-MG seeks to maximize
its amount of profit. Each upper-level problem’s objective
function states the income of each H-MG with a lower-level
priority for different scenarios. These objective functions
which must be maximized have been defined as the sum
of the product of electrical/thermal price offers and electri-
cal/thermal powers sold to consumers of each H-MG minus
the cost of operation of DERs.
BL-HIA structure includes upper-level problems and a set
of lower-level problems under each scenario w. It is noted
that if a DER is considered in the upper-level, their con-
straints from (1)–(30) are considered in the upper-level.
similarly is the case for lower-level. The upper-level prob-
lem includes decision making regarding the possibility of
forming coalition among H-MGs and their supply bids to
achieve a higher profit. On the other hand, the quantity
by DERs/consumers resources along DSM program are in-
cluded in the lower-level problem. It must be noted that all
the power exchange among H-MGs and retailers’s decisions
are to be made on the upper-level problem. In comparison,
decision-making variables at the lower-level include all the
power generation by DER resources. The upper-level objec-
tive function is considered after maximizing the income of
retailer or H-MGs in the case of independent or in the coali-
tional operations with other H-MGs (under investigated sce-
narios).
The income of H-MGs is defined as the product of the
proposed offer for selling power to H-MGs [£/kWh] by the
amount of power sold to them [kWh] minus the product of a
power purchase offer from H-MGs [kWh] by the amount of
power bought from quantity provided by other H-MGs.
6.1. The Upper-Level Problem
The upper-level relationship is formulated in this section.
The formula expressing the DER relationship given in (1)–
(30) are applicable if the related DER is considered to be in
the upper level.
6.1.1. Objective function
As was stated earlier, the objective functions of the upper-
level and the lower-level problems can be in the form of (32)–
(34). Here, the profit obtained from the coalition or the in-
dependent operation of H-MGs with more priority describes
the objective function of the upper-level problem. The upper-
level problem is to maximize the expected profit to be made
by each H-MG in the case of an individual or a group opera-
tion as well as a retailer.
6.1.2. Upper-level problem constraints
(1) − (30) (41)
Equations (1)–(30) are for H-MGs with higher priority. It
is very obvious if an H-MG with a higher priority does not
include any of the mentioned DERs, then the corresponding
constraints of such DERs are to be excluded from the problem
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formulation. Each H-MG in the upper-level problem makes
strategic decisions as per the following:
• Decisions of DERs on supply bid in the lower level of the
problem;
• Price strategic offering decisions of consumers in a H-
MG on price offers.
6.2. The Lower-Level Problem
Each lower-level problem states maximizing the profit of
an individual H-MG or a group of H-MGs with a lower prior-
ity over different scenarios. The objective of the lower-level
problem is to increase the profit of DERs. Thus, CEMS is to re-
duce the operating cost given limitations ruling over each of
the players (i.e., H-MGs, retailer, consumers). Players in BL-
HIA structure declare the amount of their generated power
and supply bids offered to the CEMS. After simulating the
bilevel problem, the electrical and thermal energy prices, the
amount of the quantity by each of the players are provided.
6.2.1. Objective function
Considering the cases described in (32)–(34), the objective
function of the lower-level problem can be taken from the
numerator of the lower-level objective function.
6.2.2. Lower-level problem constraints load shifting and the
DERs
Equations (1)–(30) apply for each H-MG with a lower pri-
ority. It is very obvious that if an H-MG with a lower priority
for example has no CHP, then its constraints must not be con-
sidered.
6.3. Power Exchange Constraints between H-MGs and Retailers
0 6 Pe−iktw 6 ηi × Pe−itw : ηGrid,eiktw ,ηGrid,eiktw (42)
0 6 Pe+iktw 6 ηi × Pe+itw : ηGrid,eiktw ,ηGrid,eiktw (43)
Equations (42) and (43) show the allowable limits on
power exchange between retailers and H-MGs.
6.4. Electrical Balance Constraint
Pe−iktw + P
D,e
itw −
(
PCHP,eijtw + P
WT
ijtw + P
ES
ijtw − P
EB,e
ijtw − P
EHP,e
ijtw + P
e+
iktw
)
+
n∑
m=1
Pe+imtw −
n∑
m=1
Pe+mitw = 0 : λ
e
tw
(44)
Equation (44) states the equilibrium relation between H-
MGs generated and consumed electrical power and electrical
power exchange (KW) with retailers. The MCP in the grid is
equal to the dual variable of (44).
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Figure 4: The grid under study.
6.5. Thermal Balance Constraints
PD,hitw − P
CHP,h
ijtw + P
EB,h
ijtw + P
EHP,h
ijtw + P
TES
ijtw + P
GB
ijtw + P
STP
ijtw
+
n∑
m=1
Ph−imtw −
n∑
m=1
Ph+imtw = 0 : λ
h
tw
(45)
Equation (45) states the relation between the thermal gen-
erated and consumed power. The thermal power price in the
dual variable grid corresponds to (45).
After the determination of price offers related to electricity
and heat and also the amount of electrical and thermal power
generation and consumption of each player, the profit made
by each of the players is determined.
Since each one of these lower-level problems is continu-
ous and convex, it may be shown by its specific constraints
including Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [21]. By us-
ing KKT conditions, the constraints for an independent or a
coalition operation of H-MGs include the following cases:
• Primal constraints (1)–(30);
• Equality constraints obtained from the derivative of a
Lagrange expression relative to lower-level variables
• Complementary constraints obtained based on lower-
level inequalities (3),(4)–(8)–(9)–(12)–(14)–(16)–
(21)–(24)- (26)–(28)–(29)–(30)–(42)–(43)
7. Results and Discussion
The grid under study is shown in Figure. 4. The energy
storage systems installed in H-MGs (A and C) are for storing
excess electrical and thermal energy generation. The capac-
ity and the number of installed equipment in each H-MG are
shown in Table 1.
In Figure. 5, load profiles of H-MGs (A, B and C) are shown.
For an independent operation of H-MGs, most of RLDs of H-
MG A are shifted from the time intervals with higher MCP
to the time intervals with lower MCP. The amount of load
shifted forms a high share of the total load of H-MGs. More
specifically, 55% of the load is shifted from time intervals with
higher MCP to other time intervals with lower MCP taking
profit maximization for H-MGs owners. On the other hand,
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Table 1: The Capacity and the Number of Equipment Installed in Each H-MG
DERs H-MG A H-MG B H-MG C
CHP
Electrical output (kWele) 142 207 -
Thermal output (kWth) 104 140 -
EHP (kWth) - 700 -
WT (kWele) 50 - -
STP (kWele) - 600 -
ES (kWele) (2kWh) - 500 -
TES (m3) - - 4
GB (kWth) 2×150 2×150 -
EB (kWth) - - 2×100
the energy consumption in such a figure has reduced signifi-
cantly when H-MGs operate in coalitional structures. Such an
energy consumption is the lowest (21%) for a coalitional sce-
nario of ({B,AC}). The energy consumption is at the lowest
level (21%) when the coalition scenario corresponds to ({B,
AC}). In addition, the reduction in the amount of load shift is
a result of a DSM program aimed at achieving a higher pay-
off for consumers by considering (a) employing load shifting
when the value of MCP is high, along with the maximum use
of H-MG A interval resources, and (b) reducing the gener-
ation cost in an effective manner when load shifting is at a
minimum. Moreover, the load profile of H-MGs in a coali-
tion structure ({A,BC}) is the same as that of the alternative
coalition structure ({AB,C}) and does not have a significant
effect on the consumption level in H-MG A. This trend is com-
pletely different from the case in H-MG B. More specifically,
during independent operation of H-MGs, the amount of load
shift in H-MG B is at its least amount (almost 30% of the
total load during 24 hours). Therefore, forming a coalition
among H-MGs would increase consumers’s participation in
the DR program that can reach almost 42% to 50%.
Such a reduction in the amount of load shift is a result of
a DSM program for reaching more pay-off for consumers by
considering criteria such as load shifting when the value of
MCP is high, the maximum use of H-MG A interval resources,
and also the reduction in the value of generation cost in the
best way and with the least amount of load shifting has taken
place. Alternatively, the load profile of H-MGs in a coalitional
structure ({A,BC}) is the same as that of such H-MGs in an
alternative coalitional structure ({AC,B}), and does not have
a significant effect on the consumption nature in H-MG A.
The least amount of load shifting is achieved when H-MGs
B and A from a coalition in the lower-level of the BL-HIA
structure, while having the objective function at an upper-
level of the structure targeting maximizing the profit of H-
MG C. Furthermore, these conditions are comparable for the
{AC, B} coalition structure, having a similar nature. Under
the previous conditions, a substantial share of the excess gen-
eration capacity is devoted to meeting H-MG C demand. As
a result, a negligible part of such energy has been allocated
for supplying responsive loads in H-MG B. It is important to
clarify that in the case of H-MG C, the value of the total DR-,
(a) H-MG A
(b) H-MG B
(c) H-MG C
Figure 5: DR+ and DR- in the H-MGs under different scenarios.
in H-MGs independent operating conditions, is significantly
greater than the value corresponding to positive demand re-
sponse (DR+) conditions. While only 17% of time intervals,
H-MG C had experienced a DR+ algorithm, such a figure
would reach 83% when a negative demand response (DR-
) would be experienced. Such a trend in demand response
(DR) is comparable to the scenario of coalition structures,
8
where the amount of the total load shift, with the value of
DR+ total load during daily performance, are close to each
other in terms of the value. The consumer’s participation per-
centage in the H-MG C has improved significantly by forming
a coalition between H-MG B and A reaching more than 40%
of the times. Only in the coalitional structure {B,AC}, such a
value can be minimum (21%).
Furthermore, these conditions are also exactly similar for
the {AC,B} coalitional structure and has a similar nature. Un-
der the previous conditions, a big share of the amount of ex-
cess generation is spent supplying H-MG C demand.
It is important to clarify that for H-MG C, the value of
the total DR- in H-MGs independent operation conditions
is much more than such a value when positive demand re-
sponse (DR+) has taken place.
Such a trend in demand response (DR) is quite similar to
the scenario of a coalitional structures, where the amount
of the total load shift and the value of DR+ total load dur-
ing daily performance are close to each other in terms of the
value.
The increasing trend of each H-MG income during an in-
dependent and a coalitional performance with other H-MGs
is shown in Figure. 6. As it is observed from this figure, each
structure can be useful for one H-MG and meanwhile can
have no benefit for other H-MGs. The best structure, which
can be useful for H-MG A, results from forming a coalition
among H-MG B and H-MG C excluding the participation of
H-MG A in this coalition. These conditions can also be use-
ful for H-MG B on the condition of forming a coalition with
H-MG C is in a higher priority of operation. For H-MG C,
the highest income is experienced when this H-MG forms a
coalition with H-MG A at an initial stage given that H-MG
B works independently. Under these conditions, the income
of H-MG A is close to the maximum value. For H-MG C, be-
cause of the lower the generated power, it is appropriate to
form a coalition in all cases with other H-MGs. In all cases in
which H-MG C has formed a coalition with other H-MGs, an
increasing trend in the income is observed. In comparison,
the income resulting from H-MG B when used independently,
is significantly improved when compared to other configura-
tions, such as coalition formation with other H-MGs. Fur-
thermore, it is possible, in some cases, for coalition forming
to have a detrimental effect on the H-MGs that form part of
the coalition.
It is also observed that the coalition among H-MG A and H-
MG B at the initial level leads to a significant reduction in the
income independently obtained by this H-MG. Moreover, it is
desirable to prevent H-MG A from forming a coalition with
H-MG B and negotiate with H-MG C to form the coalition.
In comparison, the income resulting from the independent
performance of H-MG B is also significant compared to other
cases (e.g., coalition formation with other H-MGs) and in
some cases forming coalition is harmful for these H-MGs.
For H-MG C, because of the lowness of the generated
power, it is appropriate to form a coalition in all cases with
other H-MGs.
In Figure. 7a and Figure. 7b show the values of the elec-
Figure 6: H-MGs income under different scenarios.
trical and thermal MCP, respectively. Although the average
value of the electrical MCP in the case of an independent op-
eration of H-MG C is at its minimum during the system’s daily
performance, such values can be significantly improved when
investigated at individual time intervals (i.e., one hour after
forming a coalition among H-MGs). In some of time inter-
vals, not only forming a coalition does not cause a degra-
dation in the electrical MCP, but also a small increase in
its value. Moreover, at certain intervals, its value may not
change significantly when a coalition exists compared to the
scenario where H-MGs work independently. The electrical
MCP value in {A,BC} coalition is about 54% of the times be-
come more than its value in {A,BC} combination. That is why,
no difference in values of the electrical MCP is observed for
coalitions {A,BC}, {AC,B}, {BC,A} and {C,AB}. Furthermore,
by changing the structure from {A,BC} to {B,AC}, about 33%
of the MCP value is reduced.
Such analysis also applies for the thermal MCP for the in-
vestigated structures. Finally, we can conclude from the sim-
ulation results that forming a coalition among H-MGs exist-
ing in one grid will not only have a significant effect on pro-
gramming and regulating the value of the power generated
by the generation resources but also can affect the change
in the demand consumption and the behavior of consumers
participating in the DR program with a cheaper MCP.
8. Conclusion
The paper presented an optimum development combined
problem of the quantity in a deregulated electricity market
environment. A methodology has been presented for investi-
gating the possibility of increasing incomes of H-MGs, con-
sumers and retailers existing in a multiple H-MGs. These
Participants’s performances had been properly modelled in
the market environment. A H-MG programmer tries to in-
crease its income as long as it is freely negotiating energy ex-
change with DER resources and its consumers. It can also put
the possibility of forming a coalition with other H-MGs on its
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(a) Electrical MCP
(b) Thermal MCP
Figure 7: The electrical and thermal MCP during the 24-hour system perfor-
mance.
agenda. H-MGs seek to estimate the value of the power gen-
erated by DERs and also supply/demand bids to consumers.
Meanwhile, the possibility of forming coalition among H-
MGs with the aim of maximizing the income in an indepen-
dent or a coalitional operation in a scheduling horizon is also
investigated. In this way, the H-MGs encounter pool prices
uncertainties, and the value of electrical and thermal loads.
Furthermore, if the supply bid of one H-MG is not competitive
enough, consumers may choose another H-MG for supply-
ing their demand. For investigating how forming a coalition
among H-MGs can affect the market behaviour and H-MGs’s
gained income, different scenarios were presented. These
scenarios were solved through a bilevel structure which can
be transformed into a one NLP problem. The proposed model
did not only present solutions of higher income achievements
of each H-MG in an independent or a coalitional operation,
but also provides the higher income/lower cost for each of
the retailers/consumers relative to a single level model.
The BL-HIA structure has presented an adequate frame-
work for modelling both H-MGs reaction for a better par-
ticipation in generation and effect on electricity price, and
also competition increase among H-MGs and retailers. In
the upper-level problem, H-MGs change their capacity with
the aim of maximizing their income and by predicting the
behaviour of other competitors (H-MGs) resulting from the
lower-level problem, and noting quantities and prices pro-
posed by DERs and consumers. An Optimum pricing strategy
was implemented to enable the market dynamic behavior on
H-MGs decisions. Furthermore, a daily generation schedul-
ing was presented. For a selected case study, an infinite num-
ber of Nash equilibrium was observed for the case where no
players tend to unilaterally change their pricing strategies. In
these obtained equilibrium points, the total expected profit of
all players does not change. Although it is distributed among
them.
Simulation results showed that by forming a coalition
among H-MGs, their profit, the demand value of supplied
load and the DERs generated power existing in those H-
MGs may change. Furthermore, computational simulations
showed the convergence of the proposed model for solving
real problems and simultaneously presenting solutions for
raising H-MGs and retailers income and also reducing market
clearing price. The following results can be extracted from
the structure of the developed model:
• The bilevel model hierarchical structure for modelling
the strategic behavior of each H-MG in reaction to the
behavioral change and decision making of other H-MGs
and their supply bid. Furthermore, the proposed struc-
ture can effectively encourage consumers to participate
in the electricity market and affecting them using the
DSM program.
• It had been shown that energy exchange among H-MGs
and retailers, in addition to increasing the profit of each
player, would have a significant impact on levelling the
load and reducing consumers’s power consumption lack
of support during the consumption peak period.
Appendices
Applying KKT conditions to the lower-level problem
As stated before, since the lower-level problem is a linear
problem, KKT conditions can be applied to it. The constraints
obtained from the derivative of Lagrange expression relative
to lower-level variables include the following relations:
∂L
∂P′D,eitt’w
= 0.5
T∑
t′=1
(
λ˜MCP,etw − λ˜
MCP,e
t’w
)
− γitwD,e |P′D,e
itt′w>0
ηD,eitw |P′D,e
itt′w>0
+ η′D,eitt’w + η
′D,e
it’tw = 0 : η
D,emin
itt’w
(46)
∂L
∂PD,eitw
= γD,eitw + λ
h
tw = 0 (47)
∂L
∂PCHP,eijtw
= piCHP,eijtw + η
CHP,e
ijtw − η
CHP,e
ijtw
+ γCHP,eijtw − λ
e
tw = 0 (48)
∂L
∂PCHP,hijtw
= piCHP,hijtw −
piFU
NCHP,hi
+ηCHP,hijtw −η
CHP,h
ijtw
−
γCHP,eijtw ζ
CHP,e
ij
ζCHP,hij
−λtwh = 0
(49)
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Figure 8: The profiles of the electrical and thermal loads of the H-MGs and
electricity prices for buying and selling.
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∂L
∂PWTijtw
= piWTijtw + γ
WT,e
tw − γ
WT,e
tw
− λetw = 0 (50)
∂L
∂PESijtw
= piESijtw + η
ES,e
tw − η
ES,e
tw
−
γES,eijtw
P
ES
ij
− λetw = 0 (51)
∂L
∂SOCESijtw
= γES,eijtw −γ
ES,e
ij(t−1)w+η
ES,SOC
ijtw −η
ES,SOC
ijtw
+γ′ESijw |t=1+γ
′′ES
ijw |t=24 = 0
(52)
∂L
∂PEB,hijtw
+ γEB,htw + η
EB,h
ijtw − η
EB,h
ijtw
− λhtw = 0 (53)
∂L
∂PEB,eijtw
= −piEB,eijtw − ζ
EB
ij × γEB,htw + λetw = 0 (54)
∂L
∂PEHP,hijtw
= piEHP,hijtw + γ
EHP,h
ijtw + η
EHP,h
ijtw − η
EHP,h
ijtw
− λhtw = 0 (55)
∂L
∂PEHP,eijtw
= −piEHP,eijtw − COP
EHP × γEHP,hijtw + λetw = 0 (56)
∂L
∂PSTPijtw
= piSTPijtw + η
STP,h
ijtw − η
STP,h
ijtw
− λhtw = 0 (57)
∂L
∂PGBijtw
= piijtwGB −
piFU
NGBij
+ ηGB,hijtw − η
GB,h
ijtw
− λhtw = 0 (58)
∂L
∂PTESijtw
= piTESijtw + η
TES,h
ijtw − η
TES,h
ijtw
−
γTES,hijtw
P
TES
ij
− λhtw = 0 (59)
∂L
∂SOCTESijtw
= γTESijtw − γ
TES,h
ij(t-1)w × ζTESij + ηTES,SOCijtw ,
ηTES,SOC
ijtw
+ γ′TESijw |t=1 + γ
′′TES
ijw |t=24 = 0
(60)
The complementary constraints obtained from the inequal-
ity constraints of lower-level problem are in the form of fol-
lowing relations:
0 6
(
P
CHP,e
ij − P
CHP,e
ijtw
)
⊥ ηCHP,eijtw > 0 (61)
0 6
(
PCHP,eijtw − P
CHP,e
ij
)
⊥ ηCHP,e
ijtw
> 0 (62)
0 6
(
P
CHP,h
ij − P
CHP,h
ijtw
)
⊥ ηCHP,hijtw > 0 (63)
0 6
(
PCHP,hijtw − P
CHP,h
ij
)
⊥ ηCHP,h
ijtw
> 0 (64)
0 6 PWTijtw ⊥ γWT,etw > 0 (65)
0 6
(
P
WT
ij − P
WT
ijtw
)
⊥ γWT,eijtw > 0 (66)
0 6
(
PESijtw − P
ES
ij
) ⊥ ηES,e
ijtw
> 0 (67)
0 6
(
P
ES
ij − P
ES
ijtw
)
⊥ ηES,eijtw > 0 (68)
0 6
(
SOCESijtw − P
ES
ij
) ⊥ ηES,SOC
ijtw
> 0 (69)
0 6
(
SOC
ES
ij − SOC
ES
ijtw
)
⊥ ηES,SOC
ijtw
> 0 (70)
0 6 PEB,hijtw ⊥ ηEB,hijtw > 0 (71)
0 6
(
P
EB,h
ij − P
EB,h
ijtw
)
⊥ ηEB,hijtw > 0 (72)
0 6 PEHP,hijtw ⊥ ηEHP,hijtw > 0 (73)
0 6
(
P
EHP,h
ij − P
EHP,h
ijtw
)
⊥ ηEHP,hijtw > 0 (74)
0 6
(
PTESijtw − P
TES
ij
) ⊥ ηTES,h
ijtw
> 0 (75)
0 6
(
P
TES
ij − P
TES
ijtw
)
⊥ ηTES,hijtw > 0 (76)
0 6
(
SOCTESijtw − P
TES
ij
) ⊥ ηTES,SOC
ijtw
> 0 (77)
0 6
(
SOC
TES
ij − SOC
TES
ijtw
)
⊥ ηTES,SOC
ijtw
> 0 (78)
0 6 PGBijtw ⊥ ηGB,hijtw > 0 (79)
0 6
(
P
GB
ij − P
GB
ijtw
)
⊥ ηGB,hijtw > 0 (80)
0 6 PSTPijtw ⊥ ηSTP,hijtw > 0 (81)
0 6
(
P
STP
ij − P
STP
ijtw
)
⊥ ηSTP,hijtw > 0 (82)
0 6 Pe+iktw ⊥ ηGrid,eiktw > 0 (83)
0 6
(
ξ×
(
PCHP,eijtw + P
WT
ijtw + P
ES
ijtw − P
e+
iktw
))
⊥ ηGrid,eiktw > 0
(84)
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